Abstract. We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwisestable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwisestable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
Introduction
Consider a collection of firms and consultants. Each firm wishes to hire a set of consultants, and each consultant wishes to work for a set of firms. Firms have preferences over the possible sets of consultants, and consultants have preferences over the possible sets of firms. This is an example of a "many-to-many" matching market. A matching is an assignment of sets of consultants to firms, and of sets of firms to consultants, so that firm f is assigned to consultant w if and only if w is also assigned to f . The problem is to predict which matchings can occur as a result of bargaining between firms and consultants.
Many-to-many matching markets are worse understood than manyto-one markets-markets where firms hire many workers, but each worker works for only one firm. The many-to-one market model seems to describe most labor markets, so why should one study many-to-many markets? There are two reasons.
First, some important real-world markets are many-to-many. One example is firms/consultants. But the best-known example is probably the market for medical interns in the U.K. (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) . The medical-interns example is important because it works through a centralized matching mechanism. And many-to-one theory has helped understand and shape centralized matching mechanisms for medical interns in the U.S. (Roth and Peranson, 1999) . Another example is the assignment of teachers to highschools in some countries (35% of teachers in Argentina work in more than one school). The assignment of teachers to highschools is a clear candidate for a centralized solution guided by theory. Finally, one can view many-to-many matching as an abstract model of contracting between down-stream firms and upstream providers.
Second, even a few many-to-many contracts can make a crucial difference, and most labor markets have at least a few many-to-many contracts. We present an example (Section 2.2) of a many-to-one market, where the number of agents can be arbitrarily large, and still one many-to-many contract changes the contracting outcome for all agents. In the U.S., 76% of total employment is in industries with 5% or more multiple jobholders (Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). If even a few multiple jobholders (many-to-many contracts) make an important difference, we need a many-to-many model to understand the bulk of the labor markets in the U.S.
Finally, characterizing the core in many-to-many matchings is listed in Open Problem 6 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990, page 246 )-the classic on matching markets. We give an answer to this problem.
We shall first give an overview of our solutions and results. Then we place our results in the related literature.
1.1. Overview of solutions. We argue that the core is not the right solution for many-to-many markets. One problem is that the core may not be individually rational, in the sense that there are core matchings where a firm-for example-would be better off firing some worker. Another problem is that the core may not be pairwise stable, in the sense that there may be a firm f and a worker w that are not currently matched, but where w would like to work for f , and f would like to hire w. The second problem is well-known in the literature.
The situation contrasts with one-to-one, and many-to-one, matching markets; the standard solution in these markets is the set of pairwisestable, and individually-rational, matchings. In one-to-one, and manyto-one, markets, this standard solution coincides with the core.
We consider alternatives to the core. One alternative is the setwisestable set of Roth (1984) and Sotomayor (1999) : the set of individuallyrational matchings that cannot be blocked by a coalition who forms new links only among themselves-but may preserve their links to agents that are not in the coalition. A second alternative is the individuallyrational core (defined implicitly by Sotomayor (1999) ): the set of individually-rational matchings that cannot be blocked using an individuallyrational matching. A third alternative is the pairwise-stable set, described above. A fourth alternative is a set we denote by E: matchings where each agent a is choosing her best set of partners, out of the set of potential partners who, given their current match, are willing to link to a. The definition of E is circular.
1.2. Overview of results. Matching theory proceeds normally by adding hypotheses on agents' preferences. We shall work with two hypotheses. The first is substitutability-first introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) , and used extensively in the matching literature. The second is a strengthening of substitutability that we call strong substitutability.
We explain the two hypotheses. Let f be a firm. Substitutability of f 's preferences requires: "if hiring w is optimal when certain workers are available, hiring w must still be optimal when a subset of workers are available." Strong substitutability requires: "if hiring w is optimal when certain workers are available, hiring w must still be optimal when a worse set of workers are available." Using a sports analogy, substitutability means that if w has a contract with the L.A. Lakers, and is chosen to play for the West's All Star Team, then w should play in the Lakers' first team. Strong substitutability means that, if w is good enough to play for the Lakers, w must be good enough to play for the L.A. Clippers.
Strong substitutability is stronger than substitutability. But it is weaker than separability, and not stronger than responsiveness-two other assumptions used in matching theory (separability is also used extensively in social choice).
We now enumerate and briefly discuss our main results; but we anticipate that Table 1 (Section 10, page 25) contains a summary of the results in the paper. For economy of exposition, we present results as results on E. The implications for the other solutions should be clear at all times.
If preferences are substitutable, E is nonempty, and we give an algorithm for finding a matching in E; E equals the set of individually rational and pairwise-stable matchings; a basic non-cooperative bargaining game-firms propose to workers, then workers propose to firms-has E as its set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes; a matching in E which is blocked (in the sense of the core) must be blocked in a "nonindividually-rational way;" through a coalition of agents that all have incentives to deviate from the block.
If firms' preferences are substitutable, and workers' preferences are strongly substitutable, E equals the set of setwise-stable matchings, and a matching in E must be in the individually-rational core. Thus setwise-stable matchings exist, the individually-rational core is nonempty, and our algorithm finds a matching in the individually-rational core that is setwise stable.
If preferences are substitutable, E has certain properties one can interpret as worker-firm conflict of interest, and worker-worker (or firmfirm) coincidence of interest: E is a lattice. That E is a lattice implies that there is a "firm-optimal" matching in E-a matching that is simultaneously better for all firms, and worse for all workers, than any other matching in E-and a "worker-optimal" matching in Eone that is best for all workers, and worse for all firms. Besides the lattice-structure, there are other conflict/coincidence of interest properties from one-to-one and many-to-one markets (Roth, 1985) . We extend these properties to many-to-many markets. If preferences are strongly substitutable, the lattice operations on E are the canonical lattice operations from one-to-one matching markets.
If firms' preferences are substitutable, and workers' preferences are strongly substitutable, the theory of many-to-many matchings parallels the theory of many-to-one matchings: the setwise-stable set equals the pairwise-stable set, and the setwise-stable set is a non-empty lattice. In the standard many-to-one model, firms' preferences are substitutable, and workers' preferences are trivially strongly substitutable. So our model encompasses standard many-to-one theory.
In sum, we give conditions (substitutability, strong substitutability) under which our alternatives to the core are non-empty and can be approached through an algorithm. We emphasize that-even under the strongest of our hypotheses-the core may be empty. The setwisestable set, E, and the pairwise-stable set are identical, and possess a lattice structure. The setwise-stable set, E, and the pairwise-stable set coincide with the outcomes of a simple non-cooperative bargaining model. We reproduce and extend conflict/coincidence of interest properties.
1.3. Related Literature. Setwise stability was first defined by Roth (1984) . Sotomayor (1999) emphasizes the difference between setwise stability, pairwise stability, and the core. Sotomayor (1999) presents examples where the setwise-stable set is empty; preferences in her examples are not strongly substitutable (see our Example 21). Sotomayor (1999) refers to a definition of core that in fact coincides with our individually-rational core. We are the first to prove positive results on the setwise-stable set, and the individually-rational core-in particular that they are non-empty.
The previous literature on many-to-many matchings has results for the pairwise-stable set. Roth (1984) proved that, with substitutable preferences, the pairwise-stable set is nonempty, and that there are firm-and worker-optimal pairwise-stable matchings. Blair (1988) proved that the pairwise-stable set has a lattice structure. A standard objection (Roth and Sotomayor, 1988) to pairwise-stability is that it does not allow for more general coalitions. We show that, under our structure on preferences, allowing for more general coalitions does not make a difference. As by-products of our results, we reproduce Roth's and Blair's results on pairwise stability using fixed-point methods-similar methods have been used in matching contexts by Adachi (2000) , Echenique and Oviedo (2003) , Milgrom (2003) , Roth and Sotomayor (1988), and Fleiner (2003) . Blair's lattice structure relies on a somewhat artificial order; under our strongest structure, we obtain a lattice structure with the canonical order. Roth (1985) discusses global conflict/coincidence of interest properties, beyond the lattice property of pairwise-stable matchings. We extend Roth's results to many-to-many matchings.
In recent independent work, Konishi andÜnver (2003) show that a concept they call credible group stability is equivalent to pairwise stability. Credible group stability is similar in spirit (but logically unrelated) to our bargaining set (defined in Section 4.3). Konishi and Unver work on a general model of multi-partner matching-not necessarily two-sided. Konishi andÜnver require preferences to be responsive and satisfy a separability assumption; their model is neither more or less general than our model.
A precedent to our results on a bargaining set is Klijn and Massó (2003) . Klijn and Massó study Zhou's bargaining set for the one-toone matching model. The bargaining set we propose is different from Zhou's bargaining set.
Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998) and Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) prove that the core is implemented in certain many-to-one models by simple mechanisms, similar to the one we present in Section 7. Alkan (2001) and Alkan (2002) presents properties (including distributivity) of the lattice structure on pairwise-stable matchings, in many-to-many markets with additional structure on preferences. Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2003) present an algorithm that finds all the pairwise-stable matchings in a many-to-many matching market.
Motivating examples
An example with an empty core is Example 2 in Konishi andÜnver (2003) . We do not reproduce the example here. But one can verify that it falls under the strongest of our hypotheses. Thus the setwise stable set, for example, is nonempty when the core may be empty.
We give two motivating examples. The first example shows that the core may be a problematic solution. The second example shows that many-to-many matchings can be important, even when they are rare.
2.1. The problem with the core. Example 1. Suppose the set of workers is W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, and the set of firms is F = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 }. Workers' preferences are
The notation means that w 1 prefers {f 3 } to {f 3 , f 2 }, {f 3 , f 2 } to {f 3 , f 1 }, {f 3 , f 1 } to {f 1 }, and so on. If A ⊆ F is not listed it means that ∅ is preferred to A. Firms' preferences are P (f 1 ) : w 3 , w 2 w 3 , w 1 w 3 , w 1 , w 2 P (f 2 ) : w 1 , w 1 w 3 , w 1 w 2 , w 2 , w 3 P (f 3 ) : w 2 , w 1 w 2 , w 2 w 3 , w 3 , w 1 .
Consider the matchingμ defined byμ(w 1 ) = {f 2 , f 3 },μ(w 2 ) = {f 1 , f 3 }, andμ(w 3 ) = {f 1 , f 2 }.
Note thatμ is a core matching: To make f 1 -for example-better off than inμ, f 1 should hire only w 3 , which would make w 2 hired only by f 3 , so w 2 would be worse off. Now, if f 1 is in a blocking coalition C, w 3 must be in C. Then f 2 must be in C, or w 3 would only be hired by f 1 and thus worse off. But f 2 in C implies that w 1 must be in C. Then f 3 must be in C, so w 2 must also be in C-a contradiction, as w 2 is worse off.
But isμ a reasonable prediction? Underμ, f 1 is matched to w 2 and w 3 , but would in fact prefer to fire w 2 . The problem is that f 1 is not "allowed" to fire w 2 because-as argued above-f 1 would have to form a block that includes w 2 , and w 2 is worse off if she is fired.
Example 1 shows that core matchings need not be "individually rational." Because there are actions, like firing a worker, that an agent should be able to implement on its own, but that the definition of core ends up tying into a larger coalition.
An additional problem, pointed out by Blair (1988) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990, page 177 ) is that core matchings may not be pairwise stable (see also Sotomayor (1999) ).
2.2. Many-to-many vs. many-to-one. There is a large literature on one-to-one and many-to-one matchings. Many-to-many matchings are a more general model. We have argued that, in many cases, the generality matters. Here we present an example supporting our argument; we observe that the presence of a few many-to-many contracts can change the matching outcome for all agents.
In Example 2, if one worker is allowed to match with more than one firm, the resulting stable/core matching changes for a large number of agents. Thus, even in markets where one-to-one, or many-to-one, is the rule, a few many-to-many contracts can make a big difference.
Example 2. Let W = {w, w 1 , . . . w 2K } and F = f 1 , . . . f K , f . The preferences of workers w k , for k = 1, . . . 2K, are the same:
The preferences of w are
The preferences of firms f k for k = 2, . . . K are P (f k ) : w 2k−2 w 2k−1 , w 2k−1 w 2k , ww 2k .
Firms f 1 and f K have preferences P (f 1 ) : ww 1 , w 1 w 2 P (f ) : w, w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w K .
Consider matchings µ and µ defined by
First, if w is not allowed to match with more than one firm, then µ is the unique core (and stable) matching. If w is allowed to match with more than one firm, then {w} , f 1 , f , µ blocks µ. Further, µ is the unique core matching.
The story behind the example should be familiar to academics. Suppose that firms are universities. All workers w k agree about the ranking of firms: f 1 is the best, followed by f 2 , etc. Firm f is the worst. However, worker w, an established and coveted researcher in her field, has a strong desire to work at f for geographic reasons (f is in the town where w grew up, and that is where her family lives). If part-time (many-to-many) appointments are not allowed, w will only work for f and the resulting matching is, in all likelihood, µ. On the other hand, if w is allowed to have part-time appointments at f and f 1 , µ will result.
Preliminary definitions
3.1. Lattices and preference relations. A (strict) preference relation P on a set X is a complete, anti-symmetric, and transitive binary relation on X. We denote by R the weak preference relation associated to P ; so xRy if and only if x = y or xP y. If A is a set, we refer to a list of preference relations (P (a)) a∈A as a preference profile.
Let X be a set, and B a partial order on X-a transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric binary relation. Let A ⊆ X. Denote by inf B A the greatest lower bound, and by sup B A the lowest upper bound, on A in the order B. Say that the pair X, B is a lattice if, whenever x, y ∈ X, both x ∧ B y = inf B {x, y} and x ∨ B y = sup B {x, y} exist in X. A subset A ⊆ X is a sublattice of X, B if, whenever x, y ∈ A, both x ∧ B y ∈ A and x ∨ B y ∈ A.
A lattice X, B is distributive if, for all x, y, z ∈ X, x ∨ B (y ∧ B z) = (x ∨ B y) ∧ B (x ∨ B z). Let X, B and Y, R be lattices. A map ψ : X → Y is a lattice homomorphism if, for all x, y ∈ X, ψ(x ∧ B y) = ψ(x) ∧ R ψ(y) and ψ(x ∨ B y) = ψ(x) ∨ R ψ(y). ψ is a lattice isomorphism if it is a bijection and a lattice homomorphism.
Remark 1. The product of lattices, when endowed with the product order, is a lattice (Topkis, 1998, page 13) . The lattice operations are the product of the component lattice operations.
3.2. The Model. The model has three primitive components:
• a finite set W of workers, • a finite set F , disjoint from W , of firms,
• a preference profile P = (P (a)) a∈W ∪F , where P (a) is a preference relation over 2 F if a ∈ W , and over 2
If a ∈ W ∪ F is an agent, we shall refer to any subset A ⊆ W ∪ F as a set of partners of a. If a ∈ F , a's partners will be subsets of W , and if a ∈ W , a's partners will be subsets of F .
Denote the preference profile (P (w)) w∈W by P (W ), and (P (f )) f ∈F by P (F ).
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms, allowing that some firms or workers remain unmatched.
Formally, a matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪ W into the set of all subsets of F ∪ W such that for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F :
(
We denote by M the set of all matchings. Given a preference relation P (a), the sets of partners preferred by a to the empty set are called acceptable. We allow that a firm prefers not hiring any worker rather than hiring unacceptable sets of workers, and that a worker prefers to remain unemployed over working for an unacceptable set of firms.
Given a set of partners S, let Ch (S, P (a)) denote agent a's mostpreferred subset of S, according to a's preference relation P (a). So Ch (S, P (a)) is the unique subset S of S such that S P (a)S for all S ⊆ S, S = S .
To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only acceptable sets of partners will matter, we shall represent preference relations as lists of acceptable partners. For instance,
We often omit brackets ({. . .}) when denoting sets.
3.3. Individual rationality, stability, and Core. Let P be a preference relation A matching µ is individually rational if µ(a)R(a)A, for all A ⊆ µ(a), for all a ∈ W ∪ F . Hence a matching is individually rational if and only if
Individual rationality builds on the idea that links are voluntary: if agent a prefers a proper subset A µ(a) of partners over µ(a), then she will upset µ by severing her links to the agents in µ(a)\A.
Let w ∈ W , f ∈ F , and let µ be a matching. The pair
Definition 3. A matching µ is pairwise stable if it is individually rational, and there is no pairwise block of µ. Denote the set of pairwise stable matchings by S(P ).
Definition 4. A block of a matching µ is a triple W , F , µ , where
and µ (s)P (s)µ(s) for at least one s ∈ W ∪ F .
In words, a block of a matching µ is a "recontracting" between a subset of workers and firms, so that the agents who recontract are all weakly better off, and at least one of them is strictly better off. Say that W , F , µ blocks µ if W , F , µ is a block of µ.
Definition 5. A matching µ is a core matching if there are no blocks of µ. Denote the set of core matchings by C(P ).
3.4. Substitutability.
Definition 6. An agent a's preference relation P (a) satisfies substitutability if, for any sets S and S with S ⊆ S ,
A preference profile P = (P (a)) a∈A is substitutable if, for each agent a ∈ A, P (a) satisfies substitutability.
4. Non-core setwise stability 4.1. The setwise-stable set.
Definition 7. A set-wise block to a matching µ is a triple W , F , µ , where F ⊆ F , W ⊆ W , and µ ∈ M are such that
A matching µ is in the set-wise stable set if µ is individually rational, and there are no set-wise blocks to µ. Denote the set of set-wise stable matchings by SW (P ).
This definition of SW (P ) is from Sotomayor (1999, Definition 2, pages 59-60). The crucial difference between setwise stability and the core is in item (2) of Definitions 4 and 7. By item (2) of Definition 7, a setwise block needs only involve the agents who form new matches in the block. The justification is that one only needs an agents consent to form a new match, not to maintain an existing match. Definition 4, in contrast, requires all agents involved in the blocking match to be part of the block; this feature is why the attempted "firing" fails Example 1.
Item (4) of Definition 7 contains an element of forward-looking behavior: we only consider blocks that are individually rational, so the agents who engage in blocking do not have an incentive to defect from the block. Item (4) suggests a relation with some notion of a bargaining set, a forward looking solution. We shall prove that a relation exists.
Recall Example 1. We argued that the core matchingμ (in fact the unique core matching) is not a good prediction. Consider, instead, the matching defined by µ(w i ) = {f i }, for i = 1, 2, 3. It is easy, if somewhat cumbersome, to check that µ is set-wise stable.
It also has some interest to see why µ in Example 1 is not a core matching; W, F,μ blocks µ, asμ(
. Similarly for firms. But this is a block from which all agents wish to unilaterally deviate. We characterize the blocks of setwise-stable matchings in Section 8.
4.2.
The individually-rational core.
Definition 10. A matching µ is in the individually-rational core if it is individually rational, and it has no individually-rational blocks. Denote the set of individually-rational core matchings by IRC(P ). Sotomayor (1999) restricts attention to individually-rational matchings. So she implicitly refers to the individually-rational core.
4.3. A bargaining set. Let µ be a matching.
Definition 11. An objection to µ is a triple W , F , µ , where F ⊆ F , W ⊆ W , and µ ∈ M are such that (1), (2), and (3) from Definition 7 are satisfied.
Let W , F , µ be an objection to µ. A counter-objection to µ is an objection W , F , µ to µ such that F ⊆ F and W ⊆ W .
Definition 12. A matching µ is in the bargaining set if µ is individually rational, and there are no objections without counterobjections to µ. Denote the bargaining set by B(P ).
The bargaining set reflects forward-looking agents; an objection would not be implemented if the agents who must carry out the objection have incentives to deviate.
For the one-to-one model, Klijn and Massó (2003) prove that Zhou's bargaining set (Zhou, 1994) coincides with a weak pairwise-stability solution. The bargaining set we propose is different from Zhou's because counterobjections are only allowed from "within" the objecting coalition. With more general counterobjections, one gets a larger solution, and our results would then imply that the larger solution is nonempty. But Zhou's bargaining set rules our counterobjections that only come from within-so our results do not imply that Zhou's bargaining set is nonempty. Still, it seems to us that B(P ) captures the strategic reasoning underlying Zhou's bargaining set.
4.4. The Blair Core. We introduce a solution that follows Blair's (1988) order. The purpose of the solution is methodological.
The definition of a block (Definition 4) makes formally sense for any profile of binary relations (B(s)) s∈W ∪F . Accordingly, one can define the core matchings C(B) for any profile B = (B(s)) s∈W ∪F of binary relations.
In particular, given a preference profile P = (P (s)), we can construct a binary relation
We call the resulting core, C(P B ), the Blair-Core, as Blair (1988) introduced the relation P B .
Note that a matching µ is in the Blair-Core if it is immune to deviations µ such that µ (a) = Ch(µ (a) ∪ µ(a), P (a)). But µ (a) = Ch(µ (a)∪µ(a), P (a)) is only sufficient, and not necessary, for µ (a)P (a)µ(a). So the Blair-Core contains more matchings than the core. 4.5. More pairwise stability. We introduce an auxiliary solution. The solution illustrates the role of strengthening the structure on each side of the markets; it plays a methodological role (similar to its role in Echenique and Oviedo (2003) 
, and f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)), for all w ∈ B.
Definition 13. A matching µ is stable* if it is individually rational and there is no pair (B, f ) ∈ 2 W × F that blocks* µ. Denote the set of stable* matchings by S * (P ).
A fixed-point approach.
We construct a map T on the set of "pre-matchings," a superset of M. We shall use the fixed points of T to prove results on the different notions of stability.
Pre-matchings. Say that a pair
A pre-matching ν is a matching if ν is such that ν W (w) = f if and only if w ∈ ν F (f ) .
5.2.
The map T . Let ν be a pre-matching, and let
is the set of firms f that are willing to hire w, possibly after firing some of the workers it was assigned by ν. The set U (f, ν) is the set of workers w that are willing to add f to its set of firms ν(w), possibly after firing some firms in ν(w).
The map T has a simple interpretation: (T ν)(f ) is firm f 's optimal team of workers, among those willing to work for f , and (T ν)(w) is the set of firms preferred by w, among the firms that are willing to hire w. We shall denote by E the set of fixed points of T , so
Recall Example 1 and matching µ from Section 4.1. Note that µ is a setwise-stable matching and a fixed-point of T : V (w 1 , µ) = {f 1 , f 2 }, so {f 1 } = Ch(V (w 1 , µ), P (w 1 )), V (w 2 , µ) = {f 2 , f 3 }, so {f 2 } = Ch(V (w 2 , µ), P (w 2 )), and V (w 3 , µ) = {f 1 , f 3 }, so {f 3 } = Ch(V (w 3 , µ), P (w 2 )). Similarly for firms.
Further,μ, the core matching in Example 1, is not a fixed-point of T ; as U (f 1 ,μ) = {w 2 } and {w 2 , w 3 } = Ch(U (f 1 ,μ), P (f 1 )).
Definition 14. The T -algorithm is the procedure of iterating T , starting at some prematching ν.
Note that the T -algorithm stops at ν ∈ V if and only if ν ∈ E. Let ν 0 and ν 1 be the prematchings defined by ν 0 (f ) = ν 1 (w) = ∅, ν 0 (w) = F , and ν 1 (f ) = W for all w and f . We shall consider the T -algorithm starting at prematchings ν 0 and ν 1 . See Echenique and Oviedo (2003) for a discussion of the T -algorithm in the many-to-one model.
6. Non-emptiness of, and relations between, solutions.
We organize the results according to the structure needed on preferences. In some results, we impose structure on one side of the market only. We always impose weakly more structure on workers' preferences. The model is symmetric, so it should be clear that appropriate versions of the results are true, interchanging the structure on workers' and firms' preferences. Table 1 in Section 10 (page 25) contains a summary of results in the paper.
6.1. Results under substitutability.
Theorem 15. E ⊆ S * (P ) ⊆ S(P ). Further:
(2) If P is substitutable, then S(P ) = E, E is nonempty, and the T -algorithm finds a matching in E.
Proof. See Section 11.
6.2. Results under strong substitutability.
Definition 16. An agent a's preference ordering P (a) satisfies strong substitutability if, for any sets S and S , with S P (a)S,
Say that a preference profile P is strongly substitutable if P (a) satisfies strong substitutability for every agent a.
Proposition 17. If P (a) satisfies strong substitutability, then it satisfies substitutability.
Proof. Let S and S be sets of agents, with S ⊆ S . Suppose that
Theorem 18. SW (P ) ⊆ E and B(P ) ⊆ E. Further, if P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E = SW (P ) = B(P ), and E ⊆ IRC(P ).
Proof. See Section 12.
Thus, when one side of the market has strongly substitutable preferences, we can characterize the setwise-stable set. In light of Proposition 17, Theorem 18 implies that S(P ) = SW (P ).
Theorem 19. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then S(P ), IRC(P ), SW (P ), and B(P ) are non-empty. The T -algorithm finds a matching in S(P ), IRC(P ), SW (P ), and B(P ).
Remark 2. We can weaken the definition of strongly substitutable to: For all S and S , with S = Ch(S, P (a)), S = Ch(S , P (a)), and S P (a)S,
All our results go through under this weaker definition. We chose the stronger formulation in our exposition to make the comparison with earlier work easier-it makes comparison with substitutability easier. But when we check that an example violates strong substitutability, we check for the weaker version.
6.3. Discussion of strong substitutability. How strong is the assumption of strong substitutability? We lack a characterization of strong substitutability-just as a characterization of traditional (KelsoCrawford) substitutability is unavailable. But we give a feeling for the assumption by discussing preferences that are built from preferences over individual workers.
First, strong substitutability is weaker than the assumption of separability used in matching models (Dutta and Massó, 1997; Sönmez, 1996) . Separability says that, for any set of partners S, S ∪ bP S\b if and only if bP ∅ (separability has been used quite extensively in social choice theory; e.g. Barberá, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) ). The proof that separability implies strong substitutability is straightforward; we omit it.
Second, it is not stronger than responsiveness, another common assumption is the matching literature (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a definition of responsiveness). One can easily write examples of non-responsive preferences that satisfy strong substitutability.
Third, to give a feeling for how restrictive strong substitutability is, consider the following example with four workers and a quota of 2.
1
Example 20. Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 }. Suppose that a firm has preferences over individual workers w 1 P w 2 , w 2 P w 3 and w 3 P w 4 .
Suppose the firm has a quota of 2. So only sets with two or less elements are acceptable. How can we rank the sets {w 1 , w 2 } , {w 1 , w 3 } , {w 1 , w 4 } , {w 2 , w 3 } , {w 2 , w 4 } , {w 3 , w 4 } building from preferences over individuals? Obviously we need {w 1 , w 2 } P {w 1 , w 3 } , {w 2 , w 3 } P {w 3 , w 4 }, and so on. There are two possibilities: P 1 : w 1 w 2 , w 1 w 3 , w 1 w 4 , w 2 w 3 , w 2 w 4 , w 3 w 4 , w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 P 2 : w 1 w 2 , w 1 w 3 , w 2 w 3 , w 1 w 4 , w 2 w 4 , w 3 w 4 , w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4
The ranking of {w 1 , w 4 } and {w 2 , w 3 } is undetermined; P 1 ranks {w 1 , w 4 } first, P 2 ranks {w 2 , w 3 } first. Both P 1 and P 2 are substitutable, but only P 2 is strongly substitutable: Note that w 4 ∈ Ch({w 1 w 4 } , P 1 ), and {w 1 , w 4 } P 1 {w 2 , w 3 }, but w 4 / ∈ Ch({w 2 , w 3 } ∪ w 4 , P 1 ). So P 1 is not strongly substitutable. It is simple, if tedious, to check that P 2 is strongly substitutable.
Example 20 points to a general procedure for obtaining strongly substitutable preferences from preferences over individuals when there is a quota. Let S, S ∪ bP S\b if and only if {b} P ∅ unless S and S have the maximum number of elements allowed by the quota. If S and S have the maximum number of elements, let SP S if the worst agent in S is preferred to the worst agent in S .
Finally, a trivial but important point is that, in applications, the set of acceptable partners is often quite small. And both substitutability and strong substitutability are less restrictive if fewer sets of partners are acceptable (Remark 2). For example, the set of acceptable hospitals in the National Resident Matching Program was on average 7.45, out of 3719 programs, in 2003 (source: http://www.nrmp.org/). In a recent proposal to match high schools and students in New York City by a Gale-Shapley algorithm, students would be required to rank 12-out of over 200-acceptable high schools. Students and parents complain that 12 is too long a list (New York Times story by David M. Herszenhorn, "Revised Admission for High Schools," on October 3rd, 2003).
A similar point is that several well-known examples in the literature have agents with strongly substitutable preferences. Two such examples are 6.6 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and 5.2 in Blair (1988) .
6.4. Examples. Strongly substitutable preferences imply-among other things-that there are setwise stable matchings. Sotomayor (1999) presents an example where the set of setwise stable matchings is empty. We reproduce her example in 21, and show that preferences in her example are not strongly substitutable.
Preferences in Example 21 are substitutable. So the example shows that strong substitutability is strictly stronger than substitutability.
Example 4 in Konishi andÜnver (2003) has agents with substitutable preferences, and a pairwise-stable matching that is not in SW (P ). So the example implies that our Theorem 18 is tight (We thank Hideo Konish and UtkuÜnver for pointing this out).
Example 22 shows that C(P B ) S * (P ).
Example 21. (Example 2 of Sotomayor (1999)) Each firm (worker) may form at most q f (q w ) partnerships. For each pair (f, w) there are two numbers a f w and b f w . The preferences of firms f and workers w over allowable sets of partners are determined by these numbers. Therefore, say, f prefers w to w if and only if a f w > a f w , and w prefers f to f if and only if b f w > b f w . Say that f prefers the set S ⊆ W to the set S ⊆ W if and only if w∈S a f w > w∈S a f w . Let F = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 , f 5 , f 6 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , w 5 , w 6 , w 7 }. Let q f 1 = 3, q f 2 = q f 3 = 2, q f 3 = q f 4 = q f 6 = 1, q w 1 = q w 2 = q w 4 = 2, and q w 3 = q w 5 = q w 6 = q w 7 = 1. The pairs of numbers (a f w , b f w ) are given in Table 1 (13,1) (14,10) There are pairwise-stable matchings that are not setwise stable: Consider µ, defined by
It is easy to see that µ is pairwise-stable. But µ is not setwise stable: coalition {f 1 , f 2 , w 1 , w 2 } causes an instability in µ.
The problem is that the resulting preference profile is not strongly substitutable: Consider the preference of firm f 1 , we have that
(because 14 + 13 > 14 + 4 + 3), w 4 ∈ Ch({w 1 , w 2 } ∪ {w 4 }, P (f 1 )) but w 4 / ∈ Ch({w 2 , w 3 , w 7 } ∪ {w 4 }, P (f 1 )) = {w 2 , w 3 , w 7 } (because 14 + 4 + 3 > max{14 + 4 + 1, 14 + 3 + 1, 4 + 3 + 1} )
Example 22. Let F = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 }, with preferences
Then µ ∈ C(P B ) but µ / ∈ S * (P ), as (f 1 , {w 1 , w 2 }) blocks* µ.
7. An implementation of SW (P )
We present a simple (non-cooperative) bargaining model. The set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes of the model coincides with the setwise-stable set; so the model fully implements SW (P ) in a complete-information environment.
Bargaining proceeds as follows: First, every firm f proposes a set of partners η f ⊆ W . Firms make these proposals simultaneously. Second, after observing all the firms' proposals, each worker w proposes a set of partners ξ w ⊆ F . Workers make these proposals simultaneously. Finally, a matching µ results by w ∈ µ(f ) if and only if w ∈ η f and f ∈ ξ w . In words, w and f are matched if and only if f proposes w as its partner, and w proposes f as its partner.
A strategy for a firm f is a proposal η f ⊆ W . Given a profile of firms' proposals, η = (η f ) f ∈F , a strategy by a worker w is a proposal ξ w (η) ⊆ F . A strategy profile (η, ξ) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if for all w and f ,
for all A ⊆ f : w ∈ ηf ; and if
for all A ⊆ W . In words, (η, ξ) is a SPNE if ξ w (η) is an optimal proposal, given firms' proposal η, and η f is optimal given the other firms' proposals η −f , and workers' proposals.
Theorem 23. Let P (W ) be substitutable. A matching µ is the outcome of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if µ ∈ E.
Proof. See Section 13.
Theorems 18 and 23 imply
Corollary 24. Let P (F ) be substitutable and P (W ) be strongly substitutable A matching µ is the outcome of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if µ ∈ SW (P ).
The implication of Theorem 23 and Corollary 24 is that the setwisestable matchings are exactly those consistent with a basic non-cooperative bargaining model. Thus core matchings, for example, are not guaranteed to be SPNE outcomes.
Blocks of setwise-stable matchings.
In Example 1,μ blocks µ through a coordinated, and non-individuallyrational, effort of all agents. The preferences in Example 1 exhibit agents a who want agents b, where b dislikes a but is willing to accept a if she gets c, who dislikes b, and so on until a cycle is closed. We shall call such a cycle an acceptance-rejection cycle.
We now show that a matching in E can, in fact, only be blocked through an effort of this kind.
Definition 25. Let µ be a matching. An agent a wants to add an agent b to her partners if b ∈ Ch(µ(a) ∪ b, P (a)).
An alternating sequence of workers and firms
is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ if, for k with 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, w k wants to add f k to her partners but f k does not want to add w k , while f k want to add w k+1 to her partners, and w k+1 does not want to add f k .
Theorem 26. Let P be substitutable. If µ ∈ E, and W , F , µ is a block of µ, then there is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ in µ (W ∪ F )\µ(W ∪ F ).
Theorems 18 and 26 imply
Corollary 27. Let P (F ) be substitutable, and P (W ) strongly substitutable. If µ ∈ SW (P ), and W , F , µ is a block of µ, then there is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ in µ (W ∪ F )\µ(W ∪ F ).
9. Lattice Structure 9.1. Partial Orders. We shall introduce two partial orders on V. The first (Definition 28) is the partial order introduced by Blair (1988) . The second (Definition 29) is the canonical partial order on matchings from one-to-one theory. 
Definition 28. Define the following partial orders on
Definition 29. Define the following partial orders on V F , V W and V:
The strict version of
Definitions 28 and 29 abuse notation in using each symbol (≤ B F , ≤ F , ≤ B W , and ≤ W ) for two different orders. The abuse of notation does not-we believe-confuse.
To simplify the notation in the sequel, let (
All statements that follow are true both with (≤
Remark 4. V, ≤ F is a lattice (see Remark 1), and the lattice operations are
. ν ∧ F ν is defined symmetrically; giving f the worst of ν(f ) and ν (f ), and giving w the best of ν(w) and ν (w).
V, ≤ W is a lattice, and the lattice operations are analogous to ∨ F and ∧ F .
Blair's order incorporates strong substitutability:
Proof. Let b ∈ Ch (S ∪ b, P (a)) and S P B (a)S. Note that
Where the first equality is by definition of P B and the second equality is a property of choice. Finally, b ∈ Ch (S ∪ S ∪ b, P (a)) and substitutability implies that b ∈ Ch (S ∪ b, P (a)).
Proposition 30 explains Blair's results in the light of our results. 9.2. Lattice Structure. With substitutable preferences, T is a monotone increasing map under order ≤ B . Tarski's fixed point theorem then delivers a lattice structure on E. With strongly substitutable preferences, T is a monotone increasing map under order ≤. Tarski's fixed point theorem gives a lattice structure on E under order ≤. We discuss the implications below.
Theorem 31. Let P be substitutable. Then
(1) E, ≤ B is a non-empty lattice; (2) the T -algorithm starting at ν 0 stops at inf ≤ B F E, and the Talgorithm starting at ν 1 stops at sup ≤ B F E.
Further, if P is strongly substitutable, E, ≤ is a non-empty lattice,
Proof. See Section 14
Theorem 32. Let P (F ) be substitutable and P (W ) be strongly substitutable. Then
Proof. See Section 14
, and ≤ W , we get inf
Theorem 31 implies Theorem 19. It also implies
Corollary 33. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then SW (P ), ≤ B = B(P ), ≤ B = S(P ), ≤ B are nonempty lattices. Further, if P (F ) is strongly substitutable, SW (P ), ≤ = B(P ), ≤ = S(P ), ≤ are non-empty lattices Theorems 31 and 32 have an interpretation in terms of worker-firm "conflict" and worker-worker (or firm-firm) "coincidence" of interests (Roth, 1985) .
First, Theorem 31 implies that there are two distinguished matchings in E. One is simultaneously better for all firms, and worse for all workers, than any other matching in E. The other is simultaneously worse for all firms, and better for all workers, than any other matching in E. The lattice structure thus implies a coincidence-of-interest property.
Second, Theorem 32 reflects a global worker-firm conflict of interest over E; for any two matchings in E, if one is better for all firms it must also be worse for all workers, and vice versa. Roth (1985) proved that Statement 1 in Theorem 32 holds in the one-to-one model and in the many-to-one model. Roth also proved that Statement 2 in Theorem 32 holds in the one-to-one model. Here we extend Roth's results, as workers' preferences are trivially strongly substitutable in the many-to-one model, and all agents' preferences are trivially strongly substitutable in the one-to-one model.
2
In light of Theorem 15, Theorem 33 implies that S(P ), ≤ B F is a lattice when preferences are substitutable-a result first proved by Blair (1988) . Blair shows with an example that S(P ), ≤ F may not be a lattice. Preferences in Blair's example are not strongly substitutable; we discuss Blair's example in Section 9.4.
In the one-to-one model, the lattice-structure of S(P ), ≤ F is known since at least Knuth (1976) (Knuth attributes the result to J. Conway). Theorem 31 extends the result to the many-to-many model, as preferences are trivially strongly substitutable in the one-to-one model. 9.3. Further conflict/coincidence properties. There are two additional features of many-to-one and one-to-one matchings that merit attention.
9.3.1. Stronger coincidence-of-interest property. Roth (1985) presents a stronger version of the coincidence-of-interest property implicit in the result that E, ≤ B F is a lattice. He proves that, if µ and µ are pairwisestable matchings in the many-to-one model, the matching that gives each firm f its best subset out of µ(f ) ∪ µ (f ) is stable, and worse than both µ and µ for all workers.
Roth's stronger coincidence of interest property does not extend to the many-to-many model with strongly substitutable preferences. Example 5.2 in Blair (1988) is a counterexample-we discuss this example in Section 9.4. But note
Proposition 34. Let P (F ) be substitutable. Let µ, µ ∈ S(P ). Define the matchingμ byμ(f ) = Ch(µ(f ) ∪ µ (f ), P (f )), for all f ∈ F . Ifμ(w) ∈ {µ(w), µ (w)}, for all w ∈ W , thenμ ∈ S(P ). Further, if P (W ) is substitutable, µ(w)R(w)μ(w) and µ (w)R(w)μ(w), for all w ∈ W .
Proof. The proof thatμ ∈ S(P ) is a minor variation of Roth's (1985) proof of the coincidence-of-interest property in the many-to-one model. First,μ is individually rational: µ and µ are individually rational soμ(w) = Ch(μ(w), P (w)) for all w; by definition ofμ,μ(f ) = Ch(μ(f ), P (f )) for all f .
Second, there are not pairwise blocks ofμ. If (w, f ) is a pairwise block ofμ. Then w / ∈μ(f ), f ∈ Ch(μ(w) ∪ f, P (w)), and w ∈ Ch(μ(f ) ∪ w, P (f )). Without loss of generality, letμ(w) = µ(w). So f / ∈ µ(w) and f ∈ Ch(µ(w)∪f, P (w)). But w ∈ Ch(μ(f )∪w, P (f )) implies
By substitutability of P (f ), w ∈ Ch(µ(f ) ∪ w, P (f )). Then f / ∈ µ(w) and f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) implies that (w, f ) is also a pairwise block of µ.
So µ, µ ∈ S(P ) implies that there are no pairwise blocks ofμ. When P (W ) is substitutable, S(P ) = E and it is routine to verify thatμ
Propertyμ(w) ∈ {µ(w), µ (w)} obviously holds in the many-to-one model. Thus Proposition 34 embeds Roth's result for the many-to-one model. Seemingly, the many-to-one-ness of the many-to-one model is behind Roth's result-we cannot capture the stronger coincidence-ofinterest property in a many-to-many model with additional structure on preferences. 9.3.2. Distributive property of lattice operations. The set of stable matchings in the one-to-one model is a distributive lattice (Knuth, 1976) . The distributive property of the one-to-one model does not extend to our many-to-many model: In Blair's (1988) Example 5.2, the set of stable many-to-many matchings is not a distributive lattice, and all agents' preferences in Blair's example satisfy strong substitutability (see Section 9.4).
We identify why the distributive property fails in the many-to-many model. The problem is that the lattice operations (see Remark 4) in V, ≤ may not preserve the property that matchings in E are matchingsnot only prematchings. That is, if µ ∨ µ ∈ M and µ ∧ µ ∈ M for all µ and µ in E, then E, ≤ F is a distributive lattice. This result does extend the one-to-one result.
Let us order V by set-inclusion; let ν ν if ν (f ) ⊆ ν(f ) and ν(w) ⊆ ν (w), for all f and w. Then V, is a lattice (see Remark 1).
The lattice operations are and , defined by (ν ν )(f ) = ν(f )∪ν (f ), and (ν ν )(f ) = ν(f ) ∩ ν (f ), for all f , and (ν ν )(w) = ν(w) ∩ ν (w), and (ν ν )(w) = ν(w) ∪ ν (w), for all w.
ψ| E is a lattice isomorphism of E, ≤ onto ψE, .
Proof. See Section 14
The partial order ≤ on V depends on the profile P of preferences. In Theorem 35, we translate ≤ into an order that does not depend on P : set-inclusion. We interpret the result as showing how the lattice structure on V and, under additional assumptions, E, is inherited from the lattice structure of set inclusion.
The interest of Theorem 35 is, first, that it shows why distributivity fails in the many-to-many model. Second, it shows how the distributive property in the one-to-one model is inherited from the distributive property of set inclusion on V; it is easy to verify that the one-to-one model satisfies that µ ∨ µ ∈ M and µ ∧ µ ∈ M for all µ, µ ∈ E. In fact the verification is carried out in Knuth (1976, page 56) , as a first step in the proof that S(P ), ≤ F is a distributive lattice.
Note that E, ≤ F being a sub-lattice of V, ≤ F means that the lattice operations ∨ F and ∧ F on V, ≤ F (see Remark 4) are also the lattice operations of E, ≤ F . Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2001) assuming substitutable (and q-separable) preferences, show that the stable matchings are not a lattice under ∨ F and ∧ F . 9.4. Examples 5.1 and 5.2 in Blair (1988) . We do not reproduce the examples here. We shall discuss the examples in light of our results.
Blair presents Example 5.1 as an example where S(P ), ≤ is not a lattice. In Example 5.1 there are 13 firms and 12 workers; F = {1, 2, . . . 13}, W = {a, b, . . . q}. Firm 10's preference relation is not strongly substitutable:
where . . . means that there are other acceptable sets of workers not listed. Note that {b, n, p} P (10) {m} and b ∈ Ch({b, n, p}∪{b} , P (10)), but that b ∈ Ch({m} ∪ {b} , P (10)) = {m}. Thus Blair's Example 5.1 illustrates that, with non-strongly substitutable preferences, E, ≤ may not be a lattice.
Blair presents Example 5.2 as an example where S(P ), ≤ B is not a distributive lattice. Preferences in Example 5.2 are strongly substitutablethis is easy, if tedious, to verify. Blair's example thus illustrates that E, ≤ and E, ≤ B may not be distributive lattices (the lattice operations in E, ≤ and E, ≤ B might not coincide, but in this example they do).
We show that Example 5.2 does not satisfy the property that µ∨µ ∈ M and µ ∧ µ ∈ M for all µ, µ ∈ E. So the example is not in the hypotheses of Theorem 35. In Example 5.2 there are 7 firms and 10 workers; F = {1, 2, . . . 7}, W = {a, b, . . . j}. Consider matchings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 µ 1 bcd ae af j h i g, µ 2 bcd ae i ag h f j.
Then µ 1 ∨ µ 2 is: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 µ 1 ∨ µ 2 bcd ae i j h f g a b c d e f g h i j µ 1 ∨ µ 2 24 1 1 1 2 6 7 5 3 4.
But µ 1 ∨ µ 2 is not a matching, as 4 ∈ µ 1 ∨ µ 2 (a) while a / ∈ µ 1 ∨ µ 2 (4). Finally, we show that Blair's Example 5.2 also violates Roth's stronger conflict-of-interest property. From µ 1 and µ 2 , constructing matchingμ byμ(f ) = Ch(µ 1 (f ) ∪ µ 2 (f ), P (f )), for all f , gives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 µ bcd ae i j h f g. Now,μ is blocked by the pair (1, a), soμ is not pairwise stable. Note thatμ(a) = {2} / ∈ {µ 1 (a), µ 2 (a)}. Thus Example 5.2 is not in the hypotheses of Proposition 34. Table 1 summarizes our results. Each row shows results under some hypothesis on firms' preferences. Each column shows results under some hypothesis on workers' preferences. As one moves down and right on the table, the hypotheses are stronger. Hence all results that hold in one entry, hold for all entries down and right. Roth (1985) opp. of interest (1) Strongly Subst. E, ≤ a lattice Roth (1985) opp. of interest (2) ψ lattice homomorphism Distributivity result Table 1 . Summary of Results. The empty entries in the table are completed by symmetry. An entry lists the results-in addition to the results above-and-left of the entry-we obtain under the corresponding hypotheses.
Summary
P (F )\P (W ) Arbitrary Substitutable Strongly Subst. Arbitrary E ⊆ S * (P ) ⊆ S(P ) SW (P ) ⊆ E B(P ) ⊆ E E = S * (P ) E ⊆ C(P B ) E = SP N E No additional results Substitutable E = S(P ), E = ∅ P B strongly subst. E, ≤ B a lattice T algorithm E = SW (P ) = B(P ) E ⊆ IRC(P )
Proof of Theorem 15
The following proposition is immediate, but useful in some of our proofs.
Proposition 36. A pair (B, f ) ∈ 2 W × F blocks* µ if and only if, for all w ∈ B, there is D w ⊆ µ (w) such that
and there is A ⊆ µ (f ) such that
In words, (B, f ) blocks* µ if firm f is willing to hire the workers in B-possibly after firing some of its current workers in µ(f )-and all workers w in B prefer f , possibly after rejecting some of the firms in µ (w).
We present the proof of Theorem 15 in a series of lemmas. The first statement in Theorem 15 follows from Lemmas 37 and 39. Item i) of the theorem follows from Lemmas 40 and 41. Item ii) follows from Lemma 42, and from Theorem 31.
Proof. Let µ / ∈ S(P ). We shall prove that µ / ∈ S * (P ). If µ is not individually rational there is nothing to prove; assume then that µ is individually rational. µ / ∈ S(P ) implies that there is (w, f ) ∈ W × F such that w / ∈ µ (f ) (or f / ∈ µ (w)),
Statements (1), (2), and w / ∈ µ (f ) imply that
We shall prove that (B, f ) blocks* µ. Since B = {w}, statement (3) implies that
which gives us the first part of the definition of block*. Also,
So statement (4) implies that
and we have the second part of the definition of block*. Thus, µ / ∈ S * (P ).
Remark 5. In general, S * (P ) = S (P ).
We use Lemma 38 in many of our results, starting with Lemma 39.
Lemma 38. If ν ∈ E then ν is a matching and ν is individually rational.
Equalities (1) and (3) follow from statement (6). Equality (2) is a simple property of choice sets: Ch (Ch (S, P (f )) , P (f )) = Ch (S, P (f )).
Hence we have that
So statement (7) implies that
But statements (8) and (9) give
The definition of choice set implies
Statements (5), (10) and anti-symmetry of preference relations imply that, f ∈ ν W (w). Let f ∈ ν W (w), the proof that w ∈ ν F (f ) and that
is entirely symmetric to the proof for workers above. Thus, w ∈ v F (f ) if and only if f = v W (w). So, ν is a matching. Statements (7) and (11) imply that ν is individually rational.
Proof. Let µ ∈ E. By Lemma 38 we know that µ is an individually rational matching. Fix f ∈ F, B ⊆ W such that B = ∅. We assume that, for all w ∈ B there exist D w ⊆ µ (w) such that {f }∪D w P (w) µ (w) . µ is individually rational, so µ(f ) = Ch(µ, P (f )). Then {f } ∪ D w P (w) µ (w) implies that
for all w ∈ B. By the definition of U (f, µ), we have that (13) gives
Now, µ ∈ E and statement (14) implies
Statements (12) and (15) show that there is no (B, f ) that blocks* µ. The proof that there is no (w, A) ∈ W ×2
F that blocks* µ is symmetric. Thus µ ∈ S * (P ).
Lemma 40. If P (W ) is substitutable, S * (P ) ⊆ E Proof. Let µ ∈ S * (P ) and assume that µ / ∈ E, so µ = T µ. We shall first prove that (T µ)(f ) = µ(f ), for some f , yields a contradiction, and then that (T µ)(w) = µ(w), for some w, yields a contradiction. Note that, by the asymmetric situation of firms and workers in the definition of S * (P ), the proof of the two statements is not analogous. First assume that there exist f ∈ F such that
Let A = C ∩ µ (f ) , and B = C\µ (f ) . Because µ is an individually rational matching we have that µ(w) = Ch(µ(w), P (w)) = Ch(µ(w) ∪ w, P (w)), for all w ∈ µ(f ). Hence,
Statements (16) and (17) imply that (B, f ) block* µ, which contradicts that µ ∈ S * (P ). Hence, for all f ∈ F , (18) µ (f ) = (T µ) (f ) .
Now assume that there exists
by the definition on V (w, µ). Because µ is an individually rational matching we have-by the same argument as above-that µ (w) ⊆ V (w, µ) . We can assume that G µ(w); for, if G ⊆ µ(w), then µ (w) ⊆ V (w, µ) and the Choice Property, 3 imply that
where the last equality follows because µ is an individually rational matching-but this would contradict that G = µ (w) , hence we can assume G µ(w).
Let f ∈ G\µ (w). µ is a matching, so w / ∈ µ(f ). Now, statement (19) implies that w ∈ Ch µ f ∪ {w}, P f = C.
Let A = C ∩ µ (f ) = C\{w}, and B = {w}. Then
Now, f ∈ G\µ (w) ; so substitutability of P (w) implies that there exists
Statements (20) and (21) imply that f , {w} blocks* µ, which contradicts µ ∈ S * (P ). Hence, for all w ∈ W ,
Statements (18) and (22) imply that µ = T µ. Hence µ ∈ E.
Proof. Let µ ∈ S * (P ), and suppose that µ / ∈ C(P B ). Let F ⊆ F , W ⊆ W with F ∪ W = ∅, and letμ ∈ M such that, for all w ∈ W , and for all f ∈ F
We shall need the following Claim. There exists f ∈ F , such thatμ(f )P B (f )µ(f ) if and only if there exists w ∈ W such thatμ(w)P B (w)µ(w). Proof of the claim. Letμ(f )P B (f )µ(f ). Because µ is individually rational, we have thatμ(f ) µ(f ), so let w ∈μ(f )\µ(f ). By condition (23), we have that w ∈μ(f ) ⊆ W ; but then w / ∈ µ(f ) and condition (24 ) implies that µ(w)P B (w)µ(w).
Similarly we show that ifμ(w)P B (w)µ(w) then there exist f such thatμ(f )P B (f )µ(f ). This proves the claim.
By the claim, we can assume that there exists f ∈ F such that
and B ∩ µ (f ) = ∅. Let w ∈ B. Then, f ∈μ(w) and f / ∈ µ(w), which implies thatμ(w) = µ (w) . Condition (24) implies that f ∈μ(w) = Ch(µ(w) ∪μ(w), P (w)).
By substitutability of P (w), f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f ), P (w). Now, w ∈ B was arbitrary, so together with statement (26), this implies that (B, f ) blocks* µ. Thus µ / ∈ S * (P ).
Lemma 42. If P is substitutable then S(P ) ⊆ E Proof. Let µ / ∈ E. We shall prove that µ / ∈ S(P ). If µ is not individually rational there is nothing to prove. Suppose then that µ is individually rational. Lemma 40 and µ / ∈ E imply µ / ∈ S * (P ). So, there is (f, B), with B = ∅ that blocks* µ. This means that, for all w ∈ B, f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) and B ⊆ Ch(µ(f ) ∪ B, P (f )).
But P (f ) is substitutable, so there is w ∈ B with w ∈ Ch(µ(f ) ∪ w , P (f )).
. Thus µ / ∈ S(P ).
Proof of Theorems 18 and 19
The proof of Theorem 18 follows from Lemmas 43, 44, 45, 46, and 47. Theorem 19 then follows from Theorem 31.
Proof. Let µ be a matching such that µ / ∈ E. We shall prove that µ / ∈ SW (P ). If µ is not individually rational there is nothing to prove. Suppose then that µ is individually rational matching.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there is a f ∈ F such that µ(f ) = Ch(U (f , µ), P (f )). That µ is individually rational implies that µ(f ) ⊆ U (f , µ) since, for all w ∈ µ(f ), f ∈ µ(w) so Ch(µ(w) ∪ f , P (w)) = Ch(µ(w), P (w)) = µ(w) f .
First we verify that µ is individually rational:
, and µ (w) = Ch(µ(w) ∪ f , P (f )) implies that µ (w)P (w)µ(w), for all w ∈ W . Thus the constructed W , F , µ is a set-wise block of µ, and thus µ / ∈ SW (P ).
Lemma 44. B(P ) ⊆ E.
Proof. Let µ be a matching such that µ / ∈ E. We shall prove that µ / ∈ B(P ). If µ is not individually rational there is nothing to prove. Suppose then that µ is individually rational.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there is a f ∈ F such that µ(f ) = Ch(U (f , µ), P (f )). Let F = f , let
Construct µ as in the proof of Lemma 43. We shall prove that W , F , µ is a counterobjection-free objection. Recall that
Note that µ(f ) ⊆ U (f , µ) (see the proof of Lemma 43). So Statement 27 implies that µ (f )P (f )µ(f ). Similarly, W ⊆ U (f , µ) implies that µ (w) = Ch(µ(w)∪f )P (w)µ(w) for all w ∈ W . Hence W , F , µ is an objection.
We now prove that there are no counterobjections to W , F , µ . Let W , F , µ be such that µ is a matching, F ⊆ F , W ⊆ W , and
(see the proof of Lemma 43). Also, µ (w) ⊆ µ (w), as µ (W )\µ (W ) ⊆ F ∅. Then f / ∈ µ (w) and Statement 28 implies that µ (w)P (w)µ (w). Thus W , F , µ is not a counterobjection.
Lemma 45. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E ⊆ SW (P ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 47. Let µ ∈ E. By Lemma 38, µ is an individually rational matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that µ / ∈ SW (P ). Let W , F , µ be a set-wise block of µ.
Fix f ∈ F , so µ (f )P (f )µ(f ). The matching µ is individually rational, so µ (f )P (f )µ(f ) implies that
On the other hand, w ∈ µ (f )\µ(f ) implies that f ∈ W , so
W , F , µ is a set-wise block, so µ (w) = Ch(µ (w), P (w)). Further, µ is a matching so f ∈ µ (w). Then Ch(µ (w) ∪ f , P (w)). Strong substitutability of P (w) and Statement 30 implies that
But Statement 29 and µ ∈ E imply that µ(w) ∪ f ⊆ V (w, µ). But then Statement 31 contradicts that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)).
Lemma 46. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E ⊆ B(P ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 47. Let µ ∈ E. By Lemma 38, µ is an individually rational matching. Let W , F , µ be an objection to µ. First, if µ (s) = Ch(µ (s), P (s)) for some s ∈ F ∪W , then W , F , µ has a counterobjection: let f ∈ F be such that µ (f ) = Ch(µ (f ), P (f )). Let W = ∅, F = f , and let µ be defined by µ (f ) = µ (f ) for all f = f , and µ (f ) = Ch(µ (f ), P (f )). The definition of µ (w), for all w ∈ W , is implicit. Then, µ (f ) = Ch(µ (f ), P (f )) implies that µ (f )P (f )µ (f ), and W , F , µ is a counterobjection to W , F , µ . So µ ∈ B(P ).
Second, let µ (s) = Ch(µ (s), P (s)) for all s ∈ F ∪ W . We shall prove that W , F , µ is not an objection in the first place. Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that W , F , µ is an objection to µ, so we can suppose-without loss of generality-that there is f ∈ F such that µ (f )P (f )µ(f ). The matching µ is individually rational, so
On the other hand, w ∈ µ (f )\µ(f ) implies that w ∈ W . So µ (w)P (w)µ(w), as W , F , µ is an objection. Then
and strong substitutability of P (w) gives f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f , P (w)). But we proved that f ∈ V (w, µ). So
A contradiction since µ ∈ E implies that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)). Thus W , F , µ is not an objection, and µ ∈ B(P ).
Lemma 47. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E ⊆ IRC(P ).
Proof. Let µ ∈ E. By Lemma 38, µ is an individually rational matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that W , F , µ is an individually rational block of µ.
Without loss of generality, let µ (f )P (f )µ(f ), for some f ∈ F . Since µ is individually rational,
By substitutability of P (f ), w ∈ Ch(µ(f ) ∪ w, P (f )). Thus
as w ∈ W , and µ (w) = µ(w). But µ is individually rational, so f ∈ Ch(µ (w), P (w)) = Ch(µ (w) ∪ f , P (w)).
Then statement 33, and strong substitutability of P (w), implies that f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f , P (w)). So (34) Ch(µ(f ) ∪ f , P (w))P (w)µ(w)
But µ ∈ E implies that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (f )). By Statement 32, µ(w) ∪ f ⊆ V (w, µ), which contradicts statement 34. Hence there are no individually rational blocks of µ, and µ ∈ IRC(P ). Lemma 48. Let P (W ) be substitutable. If µ ∈ M is the outcome of a SPNE, then µ ∈ E.
Proof. Let (η * , ξ * ) be a SPNE, and µ ∈ M be the outcome of (η * , ξ * ). For all w ∈ W , ξ * w (η) ∩ {f : w ∈ η f } = Ch ({f : w ∈ η f } , P (w)) . For all f ∈ F , for all η −f , let Y (η −f ) = w : f ∈ Ch f : w ∈ ηf ∪ f, P (w) .
So, by definition of SPNE, η * f ∩ Y (η * −f ) = Ch(Y (η * −f ), P (f )). Let (η, ξ) be the pair of strategies obtained from (η * , ξ * ) by having each w not propose to firms that did not propose to w, and having each f not propose to workers that will reject f . Thus, ξ w (η) = ξ * w (η) ∩ {f : w ∈ η f } and by η f ∩ Y (η * −f ) = η * f ∩ Y (η * −f ). We shall show that (η, ξ) is a SPNE as well, and that its outcome is also µ. First, it is immediate that its outcome is µ: η f = µ(f ), for all f , and for all w ∈ µ(f ), f ∈ ξ w (η) Second, given a strategy profile η for firms, each w is indifferent between proposing ξ * w (η) and ξ w (η), as they will both result in the same set of partners. For a firm f , Y (η must exist k and l such that w k = w l . Say l < k; setŵ 0 = w l , and (ŵ k ,f k ) = (w k +l , f k +l ) for k = 0, 1, . . . k − l. The resulting sequence is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ.
14. Proof of Theorems 31, 32, and 35 14.1. Proof of Theorem 31. We first establish some lemmas:
Lemma 50. Let P be substitutable. Let µ and µ be pre-matchings. If µ ≤ B µ then, for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , U (f, µ) ⊆ U (f, µ ), and V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ ).
Proof. We shall prove that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ ). The proof that U (f, µ) ⊆ U (f, µ ) is analogous.
First, if V (w, µ ) = {∅}, then there is nothing to prove, as {∅} = V (w, µ ) ⊆ V (w, µ). Suppose that V (w, µ ) = {∅} , and let f ∈ V (w, µ ). Then, w ∈ Ch(µ (f ) ∪ w, P (f )).
But µ ≤ B µ , so the definition of ≤ B implies that, for all f ∈ F , either µ (f ) = µ(f ) so w ∈ Ch(µ(f ) ∪ w, P (f )), or µ (f ) = Ch (µ (f ) ∪ µ (f ) , P (f )) . Then w ∈ Ch(µ (f ) ∪ w, P (f )) implies that w ∈ Ch (µ (f ) ∪ w, P (f )) = Ch (Ch (µ (f ) ∪ µ (f ) , P (f )) ∪ w, P (f )) = Ch (µ (f ) ∪ µ(f ) ∪ {w}, P (f )) .
The second equality above is from Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988) (Blair proves that, if P is substitutable, then Ch (A ∪ B, P (f )) = Ch (Ch (A, P (f )) ∪ B, P (f )) for all A and B). Substitutability of P implies that w ∈ Ch (µ(f ) ∪ w, P (f )) . Then f ∈ V (w, µ) , and thus V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ ).
Lemma 51. Let P be strongly substitutable. Let µ and µ be prematchings. If µ ≤ µ then, for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , U (f, µ) ⊆ U (f, µ ), and V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ ).
Proof. We shall prove that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ ). The proof that U (f, µ) ⊆ U (f, µ ) is analogous. First, if V (w, µ ) = {∅}, then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that V (w, µ ) = {∅} , and let f ∈ V (w, µ ). Then, w ∈ Ch(µ (f ) ∪ w, P (f )). Strong substitutability implies then w ∈ Ch(µ(f )∪w, P (f )), as µ (f )R(f )µ(f ) because µ ≤ µ .
Let V = {ν ∈ V : ν(s)R(s)∅, for all s ∈ F ∪ W }. We need to work on the set V instead of V because ν 0 and ν 1 are the smallest and largest, respectively, elements of V . Note that T (V) ⊆ V , so there is no loss in working with V .
Lemma 52. T | V is monotone increasing, when V is endowed with orders ≤ B or ≤.
Proof. We show that T | V is monotone increasing when V is endowed with order ≤ B . That is, whenever µ ≤ B µ we have (T µ) ≤ B (T µ ). The proof for ≤ follows along the same lines, using Lemma 51 instead of 50.
Let µ ≤ B µ , and fix f ∈ F and w ∈ W . Lemma 50 says that U (f, µ) ⊆ U (f, µ ). We first show that (37) Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) = Ch ([Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f ))] , P (f )) .
To see this, let S ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f )). Then S ⊆ U (f, µ) ∪ U (f, µ ) = U (f, µ ), so Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) R(f )S. But, Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f )), so we have established statement 37. Now, (T µ )(f ) = Ch (U (f, µ ) , P (f )) and (T µ)(f ) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f )), so statement 37 implies that (38) (T µ )(f ) = Ch([(T µ )(f ) ∪ (T µ)(f )] , P (f ))).
The proof for (T µ )(w) is analogous. Now T | V : V → V is monotone increasing, and V is a lattice (Remark 1). T (V) ⊆ V so E ⊆ V , and E equals the set of fixed points of T | V . So Tarski's fixed point theorem implies that E, ≤ B and E, ≤ are non-empty lattices. Item (2) in Theorem 31 follows from standard results (Topkis, 1998, Chapter 4) .
This finishes the proof of Theorem 31.
14.2. Proof of Theorem 32. We first prove item 1. Let ν, ν ∈ E be such that ν (w)R(w)ν(w) for all w ∈ W . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is some f ∈ F such that ν (f )P (f )ν(f ). Let C = Ch(ν(f ) ∪ ν (f ), P (f )), so CR(f )ν (f )P (f )ν(f ). But ν ∈ E implies that ν(f ) = Ch(ν(f ), P (f )) (Lemma 38), so C ν(f ). Hence there is w ∈ C\ν(f ); note that w ∈ ν (f ). Now w ∈ C = Ch ν(f ) ∪ ν (f ) ∪ w, P (f ) and substitutability of P (f ) implies that w ∈ Ch(ν(f ) ∪ w, P (f )). So f ∈ V (w, ν). Now, w ∈ ν (f )\ν(f ) implies f ∈ ν (w)\ν(w). Then ν (w)R(w)ν(w) implies ν (w)P (w)ν(w), as P (w) is strict. But ν (w) = Ch(ν (w), P (w)) = Ch(ν (w) ∪ f , P (w)) by Lemma 38. So strong substitutability implies that f ∈ Ch(ν(w) ∪ f , P (w)). Since f / ∈ ν(w), we obtain ν(w) ∪ f P (w)ν(w). A contradiction with ν ∈ E, since we showed f ∈ V (w, ν) and ν ∈ E implies ν(w) = Ch(V (w, ν), P (w)).
To prove item 2 in the theorem, note that when P (F ) is strongly substitutable the model is symmetric, and the argument above holds with firms in place of workers, and workers in place of firms.
14.3. Proof of Theorem 35. We first prove that E, ≤ is a sublattice of V, ≤ . That E, ≤ is distributive follows then immediately. We need to verify that the lattice operations ∨ and ∧ in V are the lattice operations in E, ≤ .
Let ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ E. Let ν = ν
